Monday, December 24, 2007

The phenomenon of radical Islam, or Islamism. Part III







3rd of 3 parts

The Jihadist Ideology of Islamism

Islam and Jihad

Islam declares itself to be the one and only true religion revealed by God through successive prophets, the most prominent of whom were: Abraham, Moses, Jesus, and finally Muhammad, the Seal of Prophets. Humanity is thus divided into two - believers, that is, the followers of Islam, and infidels, that is, all non-Muslims – and it is implicit that all humanity must ultimately accept the true faith of Allah and that it is the duty of the Islamic nation to propagate the faith and to fight for this goal. Among the infidels, Islam distinguishes between two main groups: idolaters or polytheists ( al-mushrikun ) and the "People of the Book" ( ahl al-kitab ), that is, Jews and Christians.

The polytheists must be fought until they accept Islam or face death. This is enjoined in the Koran, in what has become known as "the verse of the sword." [9] As for the People of the Book, Islam recognizes that the Jews and Christians have received divine revelation and divine laws, but maintains that they distorted the word of God and the holy scriptures, and are thus infidels. However, because they have received divine revelation they are given an option unavailable to polytheists: to live as a subjugated community under the rule and protection of Islam ( ahl al-dhimma ). Muslims are ordered to fight them until they choose between accepting Islam or paying a poll tax ( jizya ), which is both a precondition of their becoming tolerated and protected dhimmis, and a sign of their humiliation. This is stipulated in the Koran in "the Jizya verse." [10]

The world itself is also divided into two – the abode of Islam ( dar al-Islam ), the region under Muslim rule, and the abode of war ( dar al-harb ), referring to all lands not yet conquered. It is a Muslim duty to wage jihad in order to bring these lands into the abode of Islam.

In order to establish the generally accepted meaning of the term jihad, it suffices to examine what is taught today about this concept in Arab schools. An 11th-grade textbook used in all high schools in Jordan and the Palestinian Authority reads as follows:

"Jihad is the Islamic term equivalent to the word 'war' among other nations. The difference is that 'jihad' is [war] for the sake of noble and exalted goals and for the sake of Allah… whereas other nations' wars are wars of evil for the sake of occupying territories and seizing natural resources and for other materialistic goals and base aspirations." [11]

Jihad, unlike the "five pillars of Islam" – the declaration of faith ( shahada ), prayer, fasting, pilgrimage, and paying the zakat (alms tax) – is not usually a personal obligation. Jihad is a collective obligation incumbent upon the entire Islamic nation, and it is only under specific conditions that jihad becomes the personal obligation of each and every Muslim. There are two such circumstances: when a Muslim ruler declares jihad, it become a personal obligation for those whom he orders to take part in the war.

It also becomes a personal obligation when non-Muslims attack Muslims or invade a Muslim country. Bin Laden and the adherents of extremist Islam claim that this is the situation today: Islam, is under attack, both physically and ideologically. The infidels – Christians and Jews – are invading the lands of Islam: Saudi Arabia, Palestine, and Chechnya. Therefore, they maintain that waging jihad has become a personal obligation incumbent upon all Muslims, wherever they may be.

Islam and Shahada (Martyrdom)

The idea of self-sacrifice in battle for the sake of Allah ( shahada ) [12] is closely linked to. Anyone who is killed in the course of war with non-Muslims is a shahid (martyr), whether engaged in active fighting or not. Every Muslim man, woman, or child whose death came about – directly or indirectly – through the actions of the enemies of Islam is a shahid. Actively seeking a martyr's death ( istishhad ) is especially laudable.

The Koran promises the shahid a reward in the world to come. This glorious reward is depicted in some detail in a number of verses, and is greatly elaborated on in the Islamic tradition. The shahid 's reward is not merely direct entry into Paradise, without the "torment of the grave" ( 'adhab al-qabr) and without waiting for the Day of Judgment, but also the privilege of bringing 70 of his or her relatives and friends into Paradise.

This aspect of the reward is clearly evident in the "last will and testament" of Hanadi Jaradat, who carried out the October 2003 suicide bombing at the Maxim restaurant in Haifa. This document, posted on the website of Palestinian Islamic Jihad, reads as follows:

"In the name of Allah the Merciful and Compassionate, prayer and peace be upon the master of mankind, our master Muhammad, may Allah pray for him and give him peace.

"The Exalted One said [in the Koran]: 'Do not consider those who died for the cause of Allah as dead, rather as alive, sustained at the presence of their Lord.' [Koran 3:169] Verily, Allah's words are true.

"Dear family, whom the Lord of the world will reward as He promised us all in His Holy Book [with the words], 'Give glad tidings to those who persevere.' [Koran 2:155] Indeed, Allah promised Paradise to those who persevere in all that He has brought upon them – and what a good dwelling Paradise is.

"Therefore, reckon my sacrifice in anticipation of the reward of Allah, praised and exalted be He, to you in the Hereafter. I should not be too valuable to sacrifice myself for the religion of Allah. I have always believed in what is said in the Holy Koran, and I have been yearning for the rivers of Paradise, and I have been yearning to see the glorious light of Allah's face. I have been yearning for all this ever since Allah bestowed guidance upon me…."

The expression "reckon my sacrifice in anticipation of the reward of Allah"
recurs four times in Jaradat's letter – addressing her family, her loved ones, her father, and her mother.

After the death of a shahid, there is a celebration instead of mourning. The mother utters cries of joy, as at a wedding, and sweets are distributed to visitors.

For Westerners, jihad and istishhad are shocking and utterly incomprehensible phenomena. In an attempt to somehow make them intelligible, many commentators resort to explanations in terms understandable to the modern Westerner, claiming that Islamic terror in Europe is the consequence of economic and social factors, such as the frustration, unemployment, and economic hardships suffered by second- and third-generation Muslim immigrants in Europe.

This explanation, based on concepts familiar to the secular Westerner, appears to make sense and is therefore readily accepted. However, it utterly misses the point. When we look at the profiles of Islamic terrorists in Europe, the US, and elsewhere, we see that they do not belong to the population portrayed in this explanation. Let us consider the perpetrators of the Madrid train bombing on March 11, 2004. The leader, who blew himself up, was a Tunisian immigrant who attended a Spanish university on a generous Spanish government scholarship and also owned a real-estate business. Another member of the group, a Moroccan immigrant, owned a cellular telephone business. A third member, also a Moroccan, held a degree in chemical engineering; a fourth was an architecture student from Bosnia, who was attending school on a Spanish government scholarship.

Thus, the "frustrated second generation" theory cannot account for this attack or, for that matter, for any other terror attack. How could it serve to explain the April 2002 attack in Jerba, Tunisia, the May 2003 attack in Casablanca, the attacks in Riyadh, or even 9/11? Of the nineteen 9/11 terrorists, not one was a frustrated immigrant or second-generation immigrant; all were Arab students or professionals (15 Saudi, three Egyptian and one Lebanese).

In other words, without recognizing that the Islamist belief system lies at the root of all these terrorist acts, we cannot possibly understand the nature of these acts or the motives of their perpetrators.

Islamist terrorism has won sympathy in the Muslim world, but the Islamist call for universal jihad has had only limited success. The extremist Islamic organizations are all clandestine, and the Arab regimes, in the interest of self-preservation, fight them in various ways – including some attempts to delegitimize them from the Islamic religious point of view. Such delegitimization, however, is no simple matter, because admiration for Islam's first generation – al-salaf al-salihis shared by all Muslims, making the ideological struggle against the Islamists, who evoke the authority of "the pious forefathers," all the more difficult. Arab regimes face an inherent ideological contradiction: on the one hand, their security forces battle the jihadist organizations, while on the other hand, state-funded schools and mosques continue to disseminate the idea of jihad for the sake of Allah.

Moderate Islam: Courageous Beginnings

Moderate Islam is not the exact opposite of extremist Islam: moderate Islam has no systematic doctrine and no organizations acting in its name. It has meager financial support and no governmental backing.

While there are many moderate Muslim Arab voices today, it is still difficult to delineate the ideological structure of what could be called "the doctrine of moderate Islam." Very few of those who speak on behalf of reform are Muslim clerics; the majority are journalists or academics. Thus, it is more accurate to refer to moderate Muslims than to moderate Islam. The reformists find themselves in a conflict on two fronts. They are threatened and occasionally even physically attacked by the Islamists, and they are at times harassed or even persecuted by the Arab regimes because of their criticism of autocracy.

What views are expressed by these Arab reformists? They call for democracy, women's rights, and freedom of speech. Some criticize the tendency to construct conspiracy theories and to blame external forces (such as colonialism or Zionism) for all the ills of Arab Muslim society, a tendency very common in the Arab media and Arab political thought.

The Muslim critics of extremist Islam usually focus on its violent actions – actions that disgrace Islam – but for the most part do not address its ideological underpinnings and certainly do not question the dogma of the exemplary nature of "the pious forefathers" ( al-salaf al-salih ). There are, however, a growing number of Arab reformist thinkers who do not hesitate to deal with the crisis of Islam in the modern world at its most fundamental level. The views of four of the most courageous and outspoken reformists are outlined below: [13]

One anti-Islamist cleric is Sheikh Dr. 'Abd al-Hamid al-Ansari, former dean of the Faculty of Shari'a at the University of Qatar. Not only does he condemn the crimes of the Taliban, al-Qa'ida, and their ilk, but he also takes his fellow clerics and preachers to task over their nearly unanimous support of the powers of tyranny and evil within Islam and for their calling upon young people to volunteer in waging jihadfor the Taliban and for Saddam Hussein.

Gamal al-Bana (born 1920), the younger brother of Muslim Brotherhood founder Hasan al-Bana, was once a member of the Muslim Brotherhood himself, then later became a labor leader with socialist views. Today, he fearlessly speaks out on religious reform, maintaining that Muslims today are entitled – even obligated – to reformulate Islamic law by referring directly to the two fundamental sources of Islam, the Koran and the Hadith, while totally disregarding the whole tradition of Islamic exegesis and jurisprudence. Instead of drawing upon this tradition, he claims, they should interpret these fundamental sources in accordance with the dictates of modern life and common sense. According to al-Bana, reliance on the 1400-year-old Muslim legal tradition is a hindrance to progress and could even be said to run counter to the original intention of the Koran.

Another Muslim moderate is the Saudi Mansur al-Nuqeidan (born 1970), who was educated at a religious seminary in Saudi Arabia and served as the imam of a Riyadh mosque. As a member of an Islamist group, he was involved in violent activities; he stood trial for his role in the arson of a video store and was imprisoned for several years. During his years in prison, he underwent a profound ideological transformation and today is one of the most courageous critics of extremist Islam. Al-Nuqeidan accuses the Saudi educational system of cultivating the very same terrorism that the Saudi regime is fighting. He emphasizes the need for separation of religion and state as a precondition for true reform in the Arab world. In an interview with the Financial Times, he said: "We need an Ataturk." [14]

Shaker al-Nabulsi, perhaps the most comprehensive and systematic in his reformist approach, summed up the main principles of his position in a recent article. [15] He claims that 9/11 marks a watershed in the history of Islamic and Arab thought and that the emergence of new liberal Arabic thought is a response to this critical challenge. Speaking, as it were, for the New Arab Liberals, al-Nabulsi traces their ideological roots to the prominent reformists Afghani and 'Abduh and other later Arab liberal thinkers.

Al-Nabulsi presents his "manifesto of New Arab Liberals," enumerating their guiding principles. Among their fundamental demands regarding religion are the calls to reform religious education "in light of the domination of religious terror"; to fight "all types of armed and bloody religious and political Pan-Arab terrorism"; and to "subject the prevailing sacred values, traditions, legislations, and moral values to in-depth scrutiny." He rejects hostility towards non-Muslims as "emanating from specific political and social circumstances that existed 1500 years ago." He regards the Shari'a laws as "having been legislated for their specific time and place, and not as laws that cut through history as the clerics claim." He asserts that the obstacle to free thought and scientific thought today is not the religion as given by the Prophet himself, but Islamic thought as formulated by Muslim theologians and jurists.

He opposes the tendency to worship the past, calling upon the Arabs to liberate themselves from their illusory ideal picture of the past and for a critical examination of Islamic history "in order to understand the present." The new reformists, al-Nabulsi says, should raise all the questions avoided by their late 19th- and early 20th-century predecessors.

As for the controversial question of whether external help should be sought in order to effect change, al-Nabulsi's position is clear: "there is no harm in asking for assistance from outside forces to defeat the fierce tyranny, to completely eradicate the virus of despotism, and implement Arab democracy in light of the inability of the domestic elite and the fragile political parties to defeat this dictatorship and implement such democracy." As a precedent, he cites U.S. aid to Europe in battling Nazism and Japanese military fascism in World War II.

On the issue of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, al-Nabulsi supports a peaceful solution through negotiations, advocating complete normalization with Israel, for the benefit of both sides.

As for women's rights, al-Nabulsi advocates complete equality, and calls for "the adoption of the 1957 Tunisian Personal Status Code, which is considered the ideal Arab model of the emancipation of Arab women…"

Conclusions

To sum up, extremist Islam, or Islamism, is an organized force with a comprehensive doctrine and with no shortage of funding. Its adherents are consumed by a raging hatred of Western culture, a fanatical belief in their mission, and the unshakeable conviction that they will ultimately triumph. This is a force that must be combated.

In contrast, the Arab reformists do not constitute an organized force. These are individuals, often isolated, often with divergent liberal views. Many are persecuted in their countries. They lack political and financial support. In order for reform to take root in Arab society, the West must listen to them, encourage them and support them.

In short, extremist Islam is a threat and a danger; Arab reform offers opportunity and hope.

*Menahem Milson is professor emeritus of Arabic Literature at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and MEMRI's academic advisor. This article is based on a May 31, 2004 lecture at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.


[1] The French term Islam intégriste is equivalent to "Islamism," which has become the accepted English term for denoting extremist Islam.

[2] The Abassid Caliph Al-Mutawakkil, in the mid-9th century, for example, ordered all the Christians and Jews, who had the status of dhimmis, to wear distinctive items of clothing in order to humiliate them and discriminate against them, and imposed additional restrictions upon them. The 11th-century Murabitun (Almoravids) and the 12th-century Muwahiddun (Almohads) in North Africa and Spain persecuted the Christians and the Jews. Conversely, under Ottoman rule, Jews and Christians enjoyed relative security and tolerance, unlike minorities in Europe at that time.

[3] See MEMRI Special Dispatch No. 476, March 5, 2003, ' Bin Laden's Sermon for the Feast of the Sacrifice.' The poet quoted is al-Tirimmah ibn al-Hakim al-Ta'i (660–743 CE).

[4] Admittedly, as early as the beginning of the 18th century, as a result of the 1699 Karlovitz agreement, the Ottomans could not avoid the realization that the balance of power between the Muslims and the Christian world had shifted against them and that a reform in the system was therefore necessary. Consequently, they attempted to adopt European military techniques. However, the sense of crisis did not become widespread among the Muslim elites until the turn of the 19th century.

[5] Curiously, it is precisely Sufism that has aroused the interest and admiration of Westerners, both academic scholars of Islam and among those searching for spiritual meaning in their lives.

[6] Koran, 4:3.

[7] See www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm

[8] MEMRI Special Report No. 25, January 27, 2004, 'Contemporary Islamist Ideology Authorizing Genocidal Murder.'

[9] "Then, when the sacred months have passed, slay the idolaters wherever ye find them, and take them captive, and besiege them, and prepare for them every ambush. But if they repent and establish worship and pay the zakat, then leave their way free. Lo! Allah is forgiving and merciful [Koran 9:5]."

[10] " Fight those who believe not in Allah nor the Last Day, nor hold that forbidden which hath been forbidden by Allah and His Messenger, nor acknowledge the religion of Truth, of the People of the Book, until they pay the Jizya out of hand, in a state of submission [Koran 9:29]."

[11] Al-Thaqafa al-Islamiyya (Islamic Education), The Ministry of Education, PA, Ramallah, 2003, p. 208.

[12] Shahada, lit. "testimony" or "bearing witness," has two meanings: a) the Islamic pronouncement of faith; b) the "greater shahada, " self-sacrifice in battle for the sake of Allah, that is, martyrdom.

[13] For hundreds of documents on reform and reformers in the Arab and Muslim world, see MEMRI's Reform in the Muslim World project, at http://memri.org/reform.html.

[14] Financial Times, Weekend Magazine, July 19, 2003, p. 22.

[15] It was posted on the liberal Internet site Elaph and was published in Al-Siyassa (Kuwait), Al-Mada (Iraq), and Al-Ahdath Al-Maghribiya (Morocco) on June 22, 2004.

Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.

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