by Dr. Alex Grobman
Finding a solution to the Arab/Israeli conflict has been a constant source of frustration for American administrations. Each new U.S. president assumes he can resolve this intractable dispute either through the sheer force of his personality or his unique understanding of the problems in the region.
The Oslo Peace Accords -- which were officially signed at a public ceremony in Washington, D.C. on Sept. 13, 1993, in the presence of PLO chairman Yasser Arafat, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, and U.S. President Bill Clinton -- is among the most glaring example of how American presidents are naive about how to settle the conflict.
In "Doomed to Failure?: The Politics and Intelligence of the Oslo Peace Process," Ofira Seliktar, a professor of political science at Gratz College and adjunct professor at Temple University, analyzes the environment in which the Oslo Accords evolved, and the reasons why the agreement failed.
The downfall of the Soviet Union and the defeat of Iraq in the Gulf War in 1991 were viewed by the Israeli peace activists and their supporters in the West as a sure sign that the climate was ripe to start the Oslo negotiations that lead to the Declaration of Principles.
Shimon Peres, the most vigorous proponent of this view, believed that a new Middle East had emerged that would prevail over the "irrational" and "tribalist" attitudes like extreme nationalism and religious fundamentalism among the Arabs throughout the region.
Once peace was achieved, peace activists expected there would be an added bonus: Israel would probably abandon its own "tribal-particularistic culture shaped by the ultraorthodox and national religious Zionists in favor of a more universalistic-secular creed."
Seliktar describes how the negotiations began, the principles upon which they were based, and the Labor party's attempt to implement the accord even as Yasser Arafat's legitimacy continued to be repudiated. She explores how the Likud government attempted to effect a midcourse modification of the agreement, and Labor's efforts to circumvent and ignore PA blatant violations of the interim provisions of the Accord in order to achieve a final peace settlement.
Those who want to understand the way in which Israel predicts and manages political change will find this book of special interest. Seliktar shows us why the Oslo Accords were doomed from the start.
This is not an intellectual exercise. The reasons for the failure still exist: Israeli and Western academics and media continue to believe that if only Israel were to make more concessions, there will be peace. Overlooking Arab corruption and incitement to violence in the media, schools, mosques, and in the political arena to conclude a deal is a common ploy. Those who raised valid objections to the process, even in the security community, were vilified. IDF officers who questioned Oslo found their promotions blocked.
Seliktar also found that the appeal of "lucrative deals" with senior Palestinian "security bosses" was sufficient for some Israelis to embrace Oslo. Inexplicably, there was little interest among the Israeli public in "exposing Oslo for what it really was." As one analyst observed, "Oslo was not a political process, but a state of mind among dreamers of dreams and peddlers of illusion who misled an entire people."
It is too easy to place the blame on Israeli leaders alone. The Israeli public has to assume the greatest responsibility for going along with this farce. Israeli leaders succeeded in misleading the Israeli public because her citizens were unwilling to accept what should have been so obvious to everyone.
Nothing the Arabs said or did during the Oslo period, before or since, suggests anything other than their desire for the demise of the Jewish state. Oslo was a dangerous fantasy that continues to this day among segments of the Israeli and Jewish population throughout the world.
Israel can ill afford to live with such illusions and fantasy. Reading what the Arabs say, and how they act should be sufficient to appreciate their true intentions. This book provides additional insight into why the Oslo Accords failed and why we cannot assume our leaders know what is best.
Dr. Alex Grobman is a Hebrew University trained historian.
Copyright - Original materials copyright (c) by the authors.
1 comment:
Lawyers believe it is better to base a conclusion on fact rather than an opinion. Facts based on personal knowledge are always admissible at trial. Experts testifying based on their opinion must show by passing a voir dire examination that their opinion is worth crediting. I would credit Dr. Grobman's opinion but for the facts available from Major General Ion Pacepa based on his personal knowledge. He is the highest ranking defector from the Soviet bloc during the Cold War.
He has recounted that the Soviet Union created the PLO and groomed Arafat to lead it. It was done in 1964 when they were also creating liberation organizations elsewhere. The first created a fictitious "Palestinian People". These were referred to in the PLO charter, drafted in Moscow and affirmed by the first 422 members of the Palestinian Council, each hand picked by the KGB. Then Brezhnev, when Jimmy Carter became President, told Arafat to PRETEND to renounce violence, and to PRETEND to seek peace negotiations. Arafat had to be persuaded. Brezhnev persuaded him by telling him that if he did, the West would shower him with gold and glory. It did. Billions of dollars, much still in his Swiss bank accounts. Glory -- the Nobel Peace Prize.
Ceausescu, Pacepa's boss, warned Arafat he would have to pretend over and over and over again. Carter fell for it as every president following him. Rabin fell for it. Abbas is still pretending.
But for these revelations based on personal knowledge, I would have credited Dr. Grobman's opinion.
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